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abstract
Upon accession to the European Union, the New Member State’s budget under-
goes significant structural changes due to the appearance of new categories of 
revenues and expenditures. The aim of this paper is to estimate the possible effects 
of Croatian membership in the EU on changes in the structure and size of budget 
revenues and expenditures upon the country’s accession to the EU in the second 
half of 2013, as well as to indicate the possibilities for utilization of EU funds in 
the new financial perspective up to 2020. It is shown that in 2013 Croatia might 
realize a positive net financial position in transactions with the EU budget in the 
amount of approximately 0.28% of GDP, i.e. EUR 136 m. The total net financial 
position of Croatia due to EU accession, which includes some additional costs 
and benefits like different harmonization and the need for project co-financing at 
state and local levels, is also positive in 2013 and amounts to approximately 
0.15% of GDP or equivalently EUR 72 m. Total amount of all funds that Croatia 
might receive in the new EU financial perspective covering the period from 2014 
to 2020 amounts to EUR 6.34 bn, whereby annual amounts increase from EUR 0.7 
bn in 2014 up to EUR 1.2 bn in 2020. By using exponential regression analysis it 
is estimated that in 2020 Croatia should be a net recipient of funds from the EU 
budget in total amount of 1.72% of GDP, i.e. EUR 1.13 bn.
Keywords: Croatia, European Union, fiscal policy, membership in the EU, net 
effects of accession, EU funds, New Member States
1 introduction
The European Union (EU) continues preparation for its further enlargement. The 
accession negotiations with Croatia were closed on 30 June 2011, which allowed 
for the signature of the Accession Treaty on 9 December 2011. At a referendum 
held on 22 January 2012, 66.27% of Croatian voters supported Croatian accession 
to the European Union. Following the ratification procedure in all EU Member 
States and Croatia, accession is foreseen for 1 July 2013 (Delegation of the Euro-
pean Union to the Republic of Croatia, 2012).
The EU membership generally brings an additional fiscal pressure on a Member 
State. It comes from the necessity to contribute to the EU budget, co-finance 
projects financed by the EU funds, pre-finance some of the EU transfers during 
first period of membership, as well as to continue implementation of the acquis 
communautaire in some costly areas such as environmental protection, infrastru-
cture, border control and public administration (Antczak, Dabrowski and Gorze-
lak, 2004). 
Building the administrative infrastructure in the pre-accession period is highly 
significant, not only for better coordination and management of pre-accession 
funds  , but also for adequate preparation for use of the structural and cohesion   
related funds of the EU after membership status has been acquired. Institutions 33
p
e
t
a
r
 
s
o
p
e
k
:
b
u
d
g
e
t
 
p
e
r
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
i
n
 
c
r
o
a
t
i
a
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
u
n
i
o
n
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
t
h
e
o
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
3
7
 
(
1
)
 
3
1
-
7
1
 
(
2
0
1
3
)
and human potentials included in processes of programming, implementation and 
evaluation of the EU funds are a key determinant of every country’s absorption 
capacity and an indicator of preparedness for the effective usage of available 
funds. 
Absorption of the EU funds generally depends on three main determinants, and 
these are: macroeconomic, financial and administrative, i.e. institutional absorp-
tion capacity. Macroeconomic absorption capacity is important as a country is not 
able to provide a sufficient number of productive investment opportunities to ab-
sorb the transfers in an efficient way if these transfers are high in relation to the 
national economic performance. Administrative absorption capacity is a decisive 
factor of success for the implementation of European structural policies. Financial 
absorption capacity defines the extent to which the supported regions are able to 
co-finance the projects, which becomes more difficult with a higher ratio of EU 
payments to GDP (Osterloh, 2010). 
Financial absorption capacity, which is defined as the capability to co-finance the 
EU programs and projects, to plan and guarantee the government contribution in 
a multiannual budget and combine the contributions of the different partners in-
cluded in the whole process, is directly linked to fiscal policy. This means that 
each accession country has to take care of the potential costs of the accession 
process in advance.
The annual average of estimated total costs before accession to the EU amounted 
to 3.2% of GDP in the case of the EU New Member States (i.e. the EU-10), of 
which 1.6% of GDP was averagely financed from the general government budget, 
but this amount varies from the minimum of 0.4% of GDP in the case of Poland to 
the maximum of 3.6% of GDP in Bulgaria (Antczak, Dabrowski and Gorzelak, 
2004; Hallet, 2004). Even after accession to the EU, the New Member States in-
curred high fiscal costs for infrastructure development, as well as for public admi-
nistration reform. The average share of these expenditures in GDP was estimated 
at 2-3% on an annual level in the eight countries that entered the EU on 1 May 
2004 (Antczak, Markiewicz and Siwinska, 2006). Hence, the accession process 
leads to a negative net fiscal impact on the general government budget, which 
varies according to the degree of harmonization and can amount to as much as 3% 
of GDP in the first years after member status is obtained (Antczak, 2003).
The main objective of this paper is to estimate the possible effects of the Croatian 
accession to the EU on the structure and size of the revenue and expenditure of the 
Croatian budget upon the country’s accession to the EU, i.e. in the second half of 
the year 2013, as well as to show the possibilities for the utilization of EU funds 
in the new financial perspective up to 20201. A significant part of the analysis, with 
1 Throughout the text budget means the general government budget in every context, unless explicitly other-
wise stated.34
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some additional assumptions and corrections, will draw on the historical experie-
nces of the New Member States, and the main sources of information used in the 
analysis are the financial reports of the European Commission on the realized 
budget revenues and expenditures in the period 2000 to 2010 (European Commis-
sion, 2011a; 2011b). However, it is important to stress that the actual and total 
effects of the EU accession on the Croatian budget cannot be exactly and fully 
assessed, since they depend on many internal and external factors. Thus, the 
analysis in this paper can provide only an insight into the size and expected direc-
tion of the effects of accession. Therefore, the research results should be interpre-
ted with caution.
The introduction is followed by an overview of the existing system of EU budget 
revenues and expenditures. Since significant changes in EU budget financing in 
the period from 2014 to 2020 are envisaged, the third part of the paper provides a 
short overview of suggested reforms within a multiannual financial framework. 
The fourth part of the paper deals with qualitative and quantitative estimates of net 
financial effects of Croatian accession to the EU in 2013. The fifth part shows the 
mid-term perspective of Croatia in the period from 2014 to 2020, based on expe-
riences of the EU New Member States and publicly available information on po-
tential cash flows from the EU budget. After that follows the conclusion.
2 existing system of revenues and expenditures of the eu  
budget
Upon accession to the EU, significant changes arise in the structure of budget re-
venues and expenditures, since part of a Member State’s revenue is directly tran-
sferred to the EU budget according to standard mechanisms, while at the same 
time some new categories of revenues and expenditures appear in the budgets of 
Member States2. In the following text a synthesis of the main actual categories of 
revenues and expenditures will be given, while for the details on these budgetary 
items  one  may  consult  the  existing  literature  (see  for  instance  Kandžija  and 
Cvečić, 2011; European Commission, 2011a; Cuculić, Faulend and Šošić, 2004; 
Sopek, 2011). This system of revenue and expenditure categories is valid only 
until the end of the year 2013, i.e. in the case of Croatia it will be in force only in 
the first half year of EU membership. In the new financial perspective covering the 
period from 2014 to 2020 certain changes in some revenue and expenditure cate-
gories are proposed, and they will be examined in chapter three. However, the fi-
nancial perspective for the period 2014-2020 has still not been adopted, so it is 
uncertain whether these changes will be put in place.
Before, but also after, accession to the EU, countries are obligated to harmonize 
their tax and customs systems with the EU standards, which certainly leads to 
positive (an increase in budget revenues of a Member State) or negative (a decre-
ase in budget revenues of a Member State) effects for the budget, depending on 
2 Revenue of the EU budget actually means budget expenditure from the perspective of the Member States.35
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the level of harmonization of an accession country, i.e. Member State. However, 
besides the effects that joining the EU has on the current budget revenue (customs, 
VAT, excise duties), new categories of revenue appear as a result of transfers from 
the EU budget on the basis of participation in common EU policies. The positive 
side of getting transfers from the EU budget is manifested in a reduction of expen-
diture for financing the existing aid systems because the funds from the EU budget 
will be replaced with national funding (substitution effect).
Transfers from the EU budget can be divided into transfers that are not related to 
projects, so their amount automatically becomes the revenue of a Member State 
budget, and into transfers that depend on the absorption capacity of an individual 
Member State, which is primarily measured by administrative absorption capacity 
as a key determinant of the successfulness of implementation of EU structural 
policies, as well as financial absorption capacity as a measure of capability to co-
finance projects at both state and local levels.
In the group of transfers not related to projects belong direct aids, agricultural 
market-related expenditure and transfers on the basis of internal policies. Direct 
support schemes for farmers not related to projects come from the Agricultural 
Fund, or more precisely from the part of it for guarantees, and they constitute an 
important part of the transfers from the EU budget. These mean direct aids (the 
largest share), refunds for the export of agricultural products to third countries, 
intervention measures for regulating the agricultural markets (for wine, fruit and 
vegetables, milk, sugar, etc.) and others. Transfers by means of internal policies 
include a variety of EU programs aimed at increasing the co-operation between 
Member States in the conduct of common policies, and these are for instance pro-
grams for investment in citizenship, freedom, security, justice, education, envi-
ronmental protection, research, energy efficiency and so on. The main reason for 
the existence of these programs is that the EU considers that it is much better to 
implement common policies through various organizations, associations and legal 
entities, rather than by public authorities only.
In the group of transfers that depend on projects belong transfers from the Struc-
tural Funds, the Cohesion Fund and Rural Development Funds. Structural Funds 
have  three  main  objectives:  promotion  of  the  development  and  structural 
adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind, economic and social 
assistance to areas with structural difficulties, and assistance to adaptation and 
modernization of policies and systems for education, training and employment. 
Structural Funds cover exclusively regions whose GDP per capita is below 75% 
of the EU average and projects are co-financed by the EU up to maximum 75% of 
the eligible costs amount. Countries eligible for cohesion funding are those EU 
Member States with a gross national income lower than 90% of the EU average. 
The Cohesion Fund finances action on the trans-European transport networks, 
priority  projects  of  special  interest,  as  well  as  some  other  transport  and 36
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environmental   activities. Projects are co-financed by the EU up to maximum 85% 
of the amount of the eligible costs. Rural Development Funds mean financing 
from the European Agricultural Fund for rural development approved based on 
project plans, by which improvement in the consistency, transparency and clear-
ness of rural development financing is fostered.
As well as those stated above, there is also a third group of transfers from the EU 
budget including other pre-accession assistances, special arrangements and bud-
getary compensations, but as compared to the other two components, this one has 
a relatively small significance in total EU budget (1.5% in 2004, 0.4% in 2007, 
and 0% in 2010). Nevertheless, they were highly significant in the allocated 
amounts of New Member States in the first years of EU membership. These com-
pensations are introduced in order to prevent New Member States becoming net 
contributors to the EU budget in their first years of the EU membership. So, for 
instance, in 2004 compensations had an average share of 35% of total allocated 
funds to New Member States, with 73% in the case of Cyprus, 70% in the case of 
Malta, 41% in the case of Czech Republic and 37% in the case of Slovenia. If 
these amounts are enlarged by other pre-accession assistances, these two compo-
nents together represent an average of 55% of total allocated funds to EU New 
Member States in 2004 (European Commission, 2011b).
In addition to the above mentioned items that impact the revenue side of the EU 
budget (at the same time some of them also impact the expenditure side due to the 
need for project co-financing), there are also some new expenditure categories of 
EU Member States. Own resources of the EU budget are automatically transferred 
from the Member States’ budgets into the EU budget and for these revenues no 
individual national authority decision is necessary. Own resources of the EU bud-
get are: Traditional Own Resources (TOR), revenue from Value Added Tax (VAT-
based revenue) and revenue based on Gross National Income (GNI-based reve-
nue). A special part of the EU’s own resources consists of various corrections, of 
which the most important is the UK correction3.
Traditional Own Resources consist mainly of customs, agricultural duties and su-
gar levies, whereby 75% of all collected revenue on this basis is automatically 
transferred to the EU budget, while the remaining part of 25% is kept by a Mem-
ber State to defray the costs of their collection4. Hence, it can be concluded that 
there is a double loss for a Member State government budget, which includes di-
rect loss due to automatic transfer to the EU budget, as well as indirect loss due to 
harmonization with the EU customs tariff structure.
3 As well as the correction for the United Kingdom, there are also correction mechanisms for other largest 
net contributors – Austria, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden. These corrections are considered in text wit-
hin specific component of EU budget revenue to which they relate (within UK correction, VAT-based reve-
nue and GNI-based revenue).
4 Since the retained amounts of 25% of total collected Traditional Own Resources do not correspond to actual 
collection costs, this model can be considered a hidden correction mechanism (European Commission, 2011g).37
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VAT-based revenues are calculated as a predefined percentage of a VAT base, 
which has to be harmonized with EU rules. Still, in order to prevent disproportio-
nal payments into the EU budget, the VAT base is capped by 50% of a Gross Na-
tional Income5. However, although disproportioned payment based on VAT is 
partly restrained, it has not been fully eliminated. According to European Com-
mission (2011g), the size of the VAT base is not in practice proportional to Mem-
ber States’ GNI. Some of the richest Member States, such as Luxembourg and to 
a lesser extent Ireland, are subject to capping and thus see their contributions re-
duced. Since 1 January 2007, a uniform rate of 0.3% has been applied on the VAT 
base or 50% of the Gross National Income, whereby special exceptions are defi-
ned for Austria (0.225%), Germany (0.15%), Netherlands (0.1%) and Sweden 
(0.1%).
figure 1 
EU budget expenditure by main categories in the period 2007-2010 (in bn euro)
0 
20 
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2007  2008  2009  2010 
Preservation and management of natural resources   Sustainable growth 
Administration  EU as a global partner  Citizenship, freedom, security and justice  Compensations 
Source: Author’s calculation based on European Commission (2011b).
GNI-based revenues are definitely the biggest burden for the national budget of 
EU Member States. The total revenue of the EU budget on the basis of GNI is 
calculated as the difference between total EU budgetary expenditure and revenue 
collected on other bases. In other words, this revenue patches holes in the EU 
budget and every EU Member State pays in its own part on the basis of the rela  tive 
size of its GNI. A special privilege of a lump sum deduction of the GNI-based 
revenue has been approved to Netherlands and Sweden, amounting to EUR 605 
bn per annum for the Netherlands and EUR 150 bn per annum for Sweden, calcu-
lated at constant prices for 2004.
5 If the VAT base of a country exceeds 50% of the GNI, the applicable rate is 0.3% on 50% of the GNI. This 
limitation was introduced because it was shown that the consumption of less prosperous countries, and there-
fore the VAT base, record higher shares of the country’s GNI. Without this restriction, relatively less develo-
ped countries would pay out of proportion to their contributive capacity into the EU budget (European Com-
mission, 2011a).38
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An additional cost to a Member State budget is also the UK correction. Namely, 
after joining the EU the United Kingdom became the largest contributor to the EU 
budget, mostly thanks to the low level of transfers from the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) due to its relatively small agricultural sector. Thus, since 1985 the 
United Kingdom has been refunded a part of its payment into the EU budget in the 
amount of 66% of its net position. The loss of this revenue is made up together by 
all other Member States, with the provision that Germany, Netherlands, Austria 
and Sweden (the largest net contributors) bear only one quarter of the share.
figure 2 
EU budget revenue by main categories in the period 2007-2010 (in billion euro)
Other revenue  Surplus from previous year  Traditional own resources (75%)
GNI-based own resource  VAT-based own resource 
0 
20 
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2007  2008  2009  2010 
Source: Author’s calculation based on European Commission (2011b).
Total EU budget expenditures amounted to EUR 122 bn in 2010. The largest part 
relates to categories Preservation and Management of Natural Resources (46%) 
and Sustainable Growth (40%). Lower shares in total expenditure represent the 
categories EU as a Global Partner (6%) and Administration (6%). Preservation 
and Management of Natural Resources mainly consists of market-related expen-
diture and direct aids (78%) and Rural Development Funds (20%). The Sustaina-
ble Growth category is divided into two subcategories. The first one is Cohesion 
for Growth and Employment, representing 76% of all Sustainable Growth funds, 
and this category includes Structural Funds (79% of Cohesion for Growth and 
Employment funds) and the Cohesion Fund (21%). The other category within 
Sustainable Growth is Competitiveness for Growth and Employment with share 
of 24%, and this category includes various programs for fostering research activi-
ties, innovation, lifelong learning and social policies development. EU budget 
expenditures  have  been  recording  a  continuous  increase  in  each  year.  Total 
expenditures   in 2010 are 7% higher than those in the year 2007, 22% than those 
of 2004 and 46% higher than the total expenditure recorded in 2000. The highest 
annual increase of as much as 11% was recorded in 2004, primarily due to the 39
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enlargement of the EU by the inclusion of the New Member States. The highest 
shares of the EU budget funds in 2010 were allocated to Spain (10.8%), France 
(10.7%), Germany (9.7%) and Poland (9.7%). However, an analysis of the paid 
amount of funds from the EU budget with regard to Member States’ GNI shows 
that the largest shares in 2010 were received by Lithuania (5.9%), Estonia (5.8%), 
Luxembourg (5.2%) and Latvia (4.6%). 
Total EU budget revenue in 2010 amounted to EUR 128 bn, of which the largest 
part relates to GNI-based revenue (71%). Traditional Own Resources represented 
approximately 12% and VAT-based revenue about 10% of total EU budget reve-
nue. Various corrections that represent significant shares in Member States’ bud-
gets are irrelevant in the overall EU budget, since in the overall EU budget only 
their net position is recorded (payments of Member States into the EU budget 
minus payments from the EU budget, primarily to the United Kingdom). Unlike 
the EU budget expenditures that have been constantly recording an increasing 
trend, EU budget revenues have had a somewhat different situation, mainly resul-
ting from the impact of the global crisis. The impact of the crisis was best seen in 
a comparison of 2009 and 2008, since VAT-based revenue decreased by 33%, and 
Traditional Own Resources by 16%. Subsequently, this led to an increase in GNI-
based revenue by 10%. The largest contributors to the EU budget in 2010 were 
Germany (20.0%), France (16.4%), Italy (12.9%) and United Kingdom (12.3%)6. 
With respect to GNI, the largest contributor in 2010 was Belgium, which paid 
1.34% of its GNI into the EU budget.
3 new eu financial perspective from 2014 to 2020
For the period 2014-2020 new EU financial perspective is envisaged; it is descri-
bed in the Multiannual Financial Framework named “A Budget for Europe 2020” 
(European Commission, 2011d; 2011e) as well as in the whole set of supplements 
and amendments of this document (see for instance European Commission, 2011f; 
2011g). These documents propose numerous changes in the financing policies of 
the EU budget, i.e. its revenue and expenditure. The main changes in the period 
from 2014 to 2020 envisaged by the new financial perspective proposal, actual at 
the moment of writing this paper, will be described below. However, new financial 
perspective proposal is still uncertain; indeed, it is highly unlikely that some of the 
proposals will in the end be adopted and applied in the new financial perspective.
3.1 proposed changes in the eu budget revenues
In the financing of the EU budget in the period 2014-2020 a reform of the own 
resources system is proposed, by which current VAT-based own resources would 
be significantly changed and new own resources based on a part of the proceeds 
of a financial transaction tax (FTT) would be created. The purpose is not to incre-
ase the overall EU budget, but to contribute to national budgetary consolidation 
6 Without correction, the share of United Kingdom would amount to 15.3% of total payments into the EU 
budget.40
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efforts by reducing direct contributions from Member State budgets. The changes 
proposed will also simplify the existing contributions to the budget and increase 
the link between EU policies and EU financing (European Commission, 2011h).
Financial sector taxation would constitute a new revenue stream, therefore poten-
tially reducing the existing contributions from Member States, giving extra room 
for maneuver to national governments and contributing to general budgetary con-
solidation efforts. A financial transaction tax that could be collected at the EU le-
vel would also reduce the juste retour problems observed in the current financing 
system. An EU initiative in this area would constitute a first step towards the ap-
plication of an FTT at the global level. The financial transaction tax model propo-
sed by the European Commission would consist of two different rates, whereby 
trading with bonds and shares would be taxed at the rate of 0.1%, while for other 
financial instruments (derivative products) a rate of 0.01% would be applied (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2011g). By the amended proposal for a Council Regulation 
laying down implementing measures for the system of own resources of the Euro-
pean Union it is envisaged that two thirds of a future financial transaction tax 
would be used for financing of the EU budget, while the resting part would be kept 
in Member State budgets (European Commission, 2011j). This tax raises many 
debates and disagreements among Member States and its final application is the-
refore still uncertain, since for the adoption of this taxation model a consensus of 
Member States is needed.
The biggest opponent to the introduction of the financial transaction tax is the 
United Kingdom whose House of Lords in its report claims that there is a signifi-
cant risk that financial institutions would relocate outside the EU if the FTT is 
introduced. It has been suggested that the FTT may be adopted by some or all 
Euro Area Member States, or that a tax of a similar kind to the UK Stamp Duty 
might be pursued (House of Lords, 2012). Also very much opposed to the intro-
duction of financial transaction tax is Sweden, which introduced similar tax in 
1984. This tax did not prove to be successful, so in 1991 Sweden decided to repeal   
it. Apart from the United Kingdom and Sweden, Luxembourg, Netherlands and 
Malta also argue for the rejection of the proposal for the introduction of FTT. 
Ireland is against the mentioned proposal in case it is applied to some EU Member 
States only. On the other hand, the biggest champions of the introduction of FTT 
are Germany and France, stressing that it could help in distributing the crisis bur-
den to financial institutions, but could be also used for financing of banks seeking 
bailouts. Apart from Germany and France, positive opinions on the introduction 
of the FTT are also voiced by Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Gree-
ce, Slovakia and Estonia. 
For the calculation of new VAT-based own resources it has been proposed to em-
ploy a simple method by which a certain share of funds collected by the national 
tax administration would be transferred to the EU budget. On the basis of the VAT 41
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returns, the tax administrations would apportion the VAT receipts between the 
VAT stemming from the standard rate and the reduced rates and would then 
exclude   from the former, on the basis of national accounts data, consumption data 
or other sources, the VAT stemming from the few transactions not subject to the 
new VAT resource. Unlike the existing VAT-based own resource, the revenue st-
ream would not be capped and would not be the result of the current complex 
statistical calculations and adjustments to obtain a purely theoretical VAT base. It 
would result from the actual new VAT resource paid by all the European final 
consumers and then collected by the national tax authorities. Moreover, this sy-
stem would closely link EU policies for VAT with EU budget policies (European 
Commission, 2011g). EU budget revenue would increase in the case of a broade-
ning of a national VAT base, which can result from broadened list of taxable goods 
and services, i.e. from reduced exemptions in VAT system, or due to increased 
consumption. Moreover, EU budget revenue would increase also in the case of a 
reduction in the number of deliveries currently taxed by zero or reduced rates, 
since a standard VAT rate would then be applied to these deliveries of goods and 
services and in this case these VAT revenues would be subject to the application 
of a taxation rate for transfer to the EU budget. According to European Commis-
sion (2011i) the tax rate applied should not exceed 2%, and it is proposed that 
there should be the application of a tax rate of 1% of the net value of supplies of 
goods and services, intra-Community acquisitions of goods and importation of 
goods subject to a standard rate of VAT in every Member State determined accor-
ding to Union rules (European Commission, 2011j). Figure 3 shows realized VAT-
based revenue (% of GNI) with regard to GDP per capita PPS in 2009 and estima-
ted VAT-based revenue according to new EU budget proposal.
Revenue estimates of European Commission (2011l) for a single-rated VAT re-
source applied to a harmonized basis show that the VAT burden in Cyprus, Malta 
and Luxembourg would clearly be higher than the average, while Latvia, Slovakia 
and Romania would benefit from lower VAT charges. Figure 3 shows that the in-
troduction of new VAT-based own resource would only partially reduce dispro-
portional payments into the EU budget with regard to the development level of a 
Member State. While the average VAT-based own resource increase compared to 
the current model on the level of EU-27 should amount to approximately 267%, 
the highest increase is estimated in Netherlands and it amounts to 722% (from 
0.05% to 0.39% of GNI). As there is a strong correlation between VAT bases and 
GNI, it can be expected that a new VAT resource could bring stable and sufficient 
revenue for a budget evolving broadly in line with the GNI of Member States 
(European Commission, 2011l).
Apart from the above mentioned new categories of EU budget revenue, some 
changes in existing revenue categories have also been initiated, primarily related 
to simplification of correction mechanisms by replacing the current complicated 
system with a simple system of lump sum reductions to the GNI-based contributions   42
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paid by Member States. The proposed reform is based on the Fontainebleau prin-
ciples agreed in 1984, whereby any Member State sustaining a budgetary burden 
which is excessive in relation to its relative prosperity may benefit from a correc-
tion at the appropriate time (European Commission, 2011h). As well as changes in 
corrections, a change of Traditional Own Resources policy is also envisaged. In 
view of the proposal to incorporate the correction mechanisms into lump sums, 
the retention should be restricted to 10%, instead of 25%, which is also in line 
with the system in place until 2000 (European Commission, 2011i).
figure 3 
Realized VAT-based revenue (% of GNI) with regard to GDP per capita PPS in 
2009 and estimated VAT-based revenue according to a new EU budget proposal
Source: Author’s calculation based on European Commission (2011b, 2011l) and Eurostat.
table 1 
Estimated  changes  in  structure  of  EU  budget  financing  (in  billion  euro  and   
% of own resources)
  budget proposal 2012 2020
billion  
euro
% of own 
resources
billion  
euro
% of own 
resources
Traditional own resources 19.3 14.7 30.7 18.9
Member States’ contribution 111.8 85.3 95.0 58.4
   VAT-based own resources 14.5 11.1 29.4 18.1
   GNI-based own resources 97.3 74.2 65.6 40.3
New own resources – – 37.0 22.7
   Financial transactions  
   taxation
– – 37.0 22.7
Total 131.1 100.0 162.7 100.0
Source: European Commission (2011k); author’s adjustment.
According to estimates of European Commission (2011k), new proposal of EU 
budget financing would significantly impact the structure of own resources. It 43
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shows the shift from the existing national contributions towards the new own 
  resources. Unlike the current model, by which a major part of revenue is transfer-
red to the EU budget based on a Member State’s GNI (GNI-based revenue and 
parti  ally VAT-based revenue), the new own resources system would decrease 
Member States’ contribution based on GNI to around 40%. Taxation of financial 
transactions would constitute almost one fourth of EU budget revenue. Moreover, 
in the total revenue structure the contribution of Traditional Own Resources would 
also increase from approximately 15% to 19% (increase by 29%), and the contri-
bution of VAT-based own resources would go up from 11% to somewhere in the 
region of 18% (increase by 63%).
3.2 proposed changes in the eu budget expenditures
Items of proposal of the EU budget expenditures are always expressed in parallel 
in two different ways, i.e. showing separately commitment appropriations and 
payment appropriations. The main reason for such demonstration of budget plan-
ning is that an increasing part of expenditures relates to multiannual projects, so 
the payments are usually made over several years. Hence, commitment appropria-
tions represent the total costs in the current financial year of the legal obligations 
entered into for operations to be carried out over more than one financial year. 
This type of appropriation constitutes the upper limit of expenditure that can be 
committed during the financial year. On the other hand, payment appropriations 
cover expenditure arising from commitments entered into during the current fi-
nancial year or preceding years, but these do not include amounts related to a 
specific year that will be payable in some later period.
According to European Commission (2011h), the overall commitment ceiling 
proposed by the Commission for the 2014-2020 period (EUR 1,025 bn) is around 
3% higher than EU budget expenditures appropriated for the period 2007-2013 
(EUR  994  bn).  With  regard  to  Gross  National  Income,  the  total  amount  of   
commitment appropriations for the period 2014-2020 will be lowered to 1.05% of 
expected EU GNI, compared to 1.12% of GNI in the current multiannual financial 
framework (2007-2013).
On the other hand, the overall ceiling for payments proposed by the Commission 
for the 2014-2020 period (EUR 972 bn) is also around 3% higher than EU budget 
expenditures appropriated to the period 2007-2013 (EUR 943 bn). With regard to 
the Gross National Income, the total amount of payment appropriations for the 
period 2014-2020 will be lowered to 1.00% of EU GNI, compared to 1.06% of 
GNI for the 2007-2013 period. 
Definitely, one novelty is that the European Commission is presenting for the first 
time consolidated expenditures for the period 2014-2020, alongside the multi-
annual financial framework, which in total represent 1.11% of EU GNI (CPMR, 
2011). Consolidated expenditures mean a number of flexibility instruments which 44
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are traditionally outside the multiannual financial framework because they are not 
programmable. In this category are Emergency Aid Reserve, European Globalisa-
tion Adjustment Fund, Solidarity Fund, Flexibility Instrument, etc. However, if 
during an emergency the budgetary authority decides to activate additional funds, 
they are entered into the annual EU budget. In addition, the European Deve-
lopment Fund is financed outside the budget due to a different financing key (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2011h).
Structures of EU budget expenditures by main categories in the period 2007-2013 
and in the new financial perspective from 2014 to 2020 are shown on figure 4.
figure 4 
Structure of EU budget expenditure by main categories in periods 2007-2013 and 
2014-2020 (in %) 
44.03 47.89
43.05 37.36
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
Total 2007-2013  Total 2014-2020 
Preservation and management of natural resources   Sustainable growth 
Administration  EU as a global partner  Citizenship, freedom, security and justice  Compensations 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Council of the EU (2005) and European Commission 
(2011h).
The categories Sustainable Growth and Preservation and Management of Natural 
Resources represent over five sixths of total EU budget expenditures, i.e. 87% in 
the period 2007-2013 and 85% in the period 2014-2020. The categories EU as a 
global player and Administration represent lower shares in total expenditures, i.e. 
6-7% and 6% respectively. As compared to the financial perspective 2007-2013, 
in the new financial perspective 2014-2020 certain changes are proposed in the 
structure of expenditures, meaning that according to the actual proposal the cate-
gory Sustainable Growth would be increased from 44% to 48% of total expendi-
tures, while the category Preservation and Management of Natural Resources 
would be decreased from 43% to 37% of total expenditures. 
In general, in the period 2014-2020 the Common Agricultural Policy and Cohe-
sion Policy remain the EU’s two biggest budgetary items (respectively 36.3% and 45
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32.8% of the 2014-2020 budget), but their budgets have been somewhat reduced 
(-16.4%) to the advantage of Research, Development and Innovation (+35%) and 
External Aid (+25%) in particular (CPMR, 2011).
Cohesion policy continues to be concentrated on the less developed regions and 
Member States with GDP per capita less than 75% of the European average (so 
called convergence regions). The moderate reduction in the Cohesion Policy bud-
get can be partly explained by the fact that some regions have phased out of the 
convergence objective. Within the Cohesion Policy it is planned to create a new 
category (so called transition regions), which will concern regions whose GDP 
per capita is between 75% and 90% of the EU average. Among these regions, 
those phasing out of the convergence objective will benefit from a “safety net” 
equivalent to two-thirds of their current budget allocation (CPMR, 2011). There 
are also so called competitiveness regions, covered by the Regional Competitive-
ness and Employment program, whose GDP per capita is at least 75% of the EU 
average. The amount of resources allocated to these regions depends on their 
unemployment rate, employment in less prosperous economic sectors, level of 
education, population density, etc. (Kandžija and Cvečić, 2011).
According to proposal of European Commission (2011d), Cohesion Policy funds 
in a total amount of EUR 376 bn, including both Structural Funds and Cohesion 
Fund, will be allocated to the following segments:
  – EUR 162.6 bn (43%) to convergence regions;
  – EUR 38.9 bn (10%) to transition regions;
  – EUR 53.1 bn (14%) to competitiveness regions;
  – EUR 11.7 bn (3%) to territorial cooperation;
  – EUR 68.7 bn (18%) to the Cohesion Fund.
Besides that, EUR 40 bn (11%) will be allocated to the Connecting Europe Faci-
lity in the following amounts: EUR 9.1 bn to the energy sector, EUR 21.6 bn to 
transport (including additional EUR 10 bn that will be secured within Cohesion 
Fund) and EUR 9.1 bn to information and communication technologies.
Delays in the preparation of projects, commitments and spending are responsible 
for an important backlog of unused appropriations at the end of the present finan-
cing period. Furthermore, the fiscal situation in some Member States has made it 
more difficult to release funds to provide national co-financing. Experiences with 
the current financial framework show that many Member States have difficulties 
in absorbing large volumes of EU funds over a limited period of time. In order to 
strengthen absorption of funding the European Commission (2011d) proposed 
  three steps related to cohesion policy:
  – to fix the capping rates for cohesion allocations at 2.5% of GNI;46
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  – to allow for a temporary increase in the co-financing rate by 5 to 10 percen-
tage points, thus reducing the effort required from national budgets at a time 
of fiscal consolidation, while keeping the same overall level of EU funding;
  – to include certain conditions in the partnership contracts regarding the im-
provement of administrative capacity.
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) comprises two basic pillars, and these 
are agricultural market measures (first pillar) and the Rural Development Funds 
(second pillar). The new proposal of European Commission (2011d) suggests that 
CAP in the new financial perspective contains a “greener” and more equitably 
distributed first pillar and a second pillar that is more focused on competitiveness 
and innovation, climate change and the environment. On this basis a total of EUR 
281.8 bn will be allocated for the first pillar and EUR 89.9 bn for the second pillar 
for the whole period 2014-2020.
New Common Agricultural Policy (European Commission, 2011d) introduces 
  three novelties, and these are as follows:
  – Greening of direct payments, which means that 30% of direct support to 
farmers is being made conditional on “greening”, ensuring that the CAP 
helps the EU to deliver on its environmental and climate action objectives, 
beyond the cross-compliance requirements of current legislation. This me-
ans that all farmers must engage in environmentally supportive practices 
which will be defined in legislation and which will be verifiable. The impact 
will be to shift the agricultural sector significantly in a more sustainable di-
rection, with farmers receiving payments to deliver public goods to their 
fellow citizens.
  – Convergence of payments, by which the levels of direct support per hectare 
will be progressively adjusted, taking account of the differences that still 
exist in wage levels and input costs, in order to ensure a more equal distribu-
tion of direct support. This will be achieved in a way that, over the period, 
all Member States with direct payments below the level of 90% of the EU 
average will close one third of the gap between their current level and this 
level. This convergence will be financed proportionally by all Member Sta-
tes with direct payments above the EU average. Equally, the allocation of 
Rural Development Funds will be revisited on the basis of more objective 
criteria and better targeted to the objectives of the policy. This will ensure a 
fairer treatment of farmers performing the same activities.
  – Capping the level of direct payments by limiting the basic layer of direct 
income support that large agricultural holdings may receive, while taking 
account of the economies of scale of larger structures and the direct em-
ployment these structures generate. The Commission proposes that the sa-
vings be recycled into the budgetary allocation for rural development and 
retained within the national envelopes of the Member States in which they 
originate.47
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The allocation of Rural Development Funds should be based on more objective 
criteria and better targeted to the aims of the policy. This would ensure a fairer 
treatment  of  farmers  performing  the  same  activities  (European  Commission, 
2011h).
Apart from the Cohesion Policies included in category I. Smart and Inclusive 
Growth and Common Agricultural Policies in category II. Sustainable Growth: 
Natural Resources, the EU also plans expenditures in the total amount of EUR 
151 bn, distributed among the following categories:
  – Security and citizenship – EUR 18.5 bn (2% of total EU budget in the period 
2014-2020);
  – Global Europe – EUR 70.0 bn (7%);
  – Administration – EUR 62.6 bn (6%).
4 effects of the accession on the croatian budget in 2013
Upon the accession of Croatia to the European Union, the Croatian budget will 
encounter numerous structural changes, of which some will have only a one-time 
effect, visible in the year 2013, while some of them will permanently impact bud-
getary cash flows. In this part of the paper the basic objective is to estimate the real 
effects of accession on the Croatian budget in 2013, which will be also the last 
year of the current financial perspective 2007-2013, while potential effects in the 
period from 2014 to 2020 will be closely examined in the following part of the 
paper.
Before, but also after, accession to the EU, countries are obligated to harmonize 
their tax and customs systems with the EU standards. Croatia has almost fully 
performed this harmonization. According to the Croatia 2011 Progress Report 
(European Commission, 2011c), Croatian legislation regulating indirect taxation 
is largely in line with the EU acquis, but further alignment is required in the field 
of VAT, notably on the scope of the reduced rates and of exemptions, free zones 
and special schemes. 
In Croatia a zero VAT rate is still applied to a certain group of products, while the 
European Union prescribes the usage of a maximum of two reduced rates that may 
not be lower than 5% (Council Directive 112/2006/EZ of the European Union, 
2006). Sopek (2012) estimates that upon harmonization of the reduced rates with 
the EU Directive, with the assumption of all other rates being unchanged, go-
vernment revenue will increase by an amount equal to 0.4% of GDP in the case of 
the application of the lowest prescribed VAT rate of 5% on deliveries that are 
currently taxed at the zero rate, or analogously 0.8% of GDP in case of application 
of a VAT rate of 10%.48
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Due to harmonization of Croatian excise duties system with the EU Directives 
additional harmonization in the field of excise duties with regard to chargeability 
of duty on coal, gas and electricity and minimum rates can be expected (European 
Commission, 2011c). The Screening Report for Croatia on Chapter 16 – Taxation 
for the period up to March 2010, states that, aiming at the harmonization of the 
Croatian excise duties legislation with the acquis, Excise Duties Act (NN 83/09) 
was adopted, entering into force on 1 January 2010. The Act is aligned with the 
horizontal Directive 92/12/EEC on excise duties and with the acquis concerning 
the harmonized excise duties levied on alcohol and alcoholic beverages, tobacco 
products and energy products (Government of Republic of Croatia, 2010a). Af-
terwards, the Regulation on the Excise Duty Rate on Tobacco Products (NN 
102/10) proposed an increase in proportional excise duties from 30% to 33% of 
the relevant retail selling price. Due to this increase, the share of overall excise 
duty (specific plus proportional excise) increased approximating the minimum 
rate of 57% of the retail selling price required under European legislation (Kuliš, 
2010). With regard to the obligation of reaching an overall excise duty on cigaret-
tes of at least 60% of the weighted average retail selling price of cigarettes relea-
sed for consumption and the minimum requirement of EUR 90 per 1,000 cigaret-
tes up to 1 January 2012, Croatia has requested a transitional period until the end 
of 2017 to meet the mentioned requests, as was envisaged for certain EU Member 
States. Moreover, Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008, which 
entered into force on 1 April 2010, introduced a legislative framework for compu-
terizing the movement and surveillance of excisable products. Following the tech-
nical consultations with European Commission representatives, Croatia should 
harmonize its excise duties legislation with Council Directive 2008/118/EC no 
later than up to the moment of accession to the EU. In the same period Croatia 
should also enforce amendments of the Excise Duties Act in part related to ac-
counting accruals of excise duties on natural gas and electricity (Government of 
Republic of Croatia, 2010b). Since there is no publicly available analysis of the 
possible financial implications of the above mentioned harmonizations, and ha-
ving in mind that the major categories of excise duties are already harmonized 
with the EU Directives7, for the analysis hereafter it will be assumed that the total 
net effect will be negligible. Still, it is suggested that a detailed analysis of misa-
lignments of Croatian and European excise duties system be initiated, and the net 
effect of their harmonization estimated. Apart from the potential costs or benefits 
to the general government budget, this analysis should definitely include potential 
impacts to the total costs of tax authorities, i.e. administrative and compliance 
costs of taxation, as well as other costs induced by economic distortions generated 
by the nature of these taxes like changes in demand for these products and conse-
quently changes in the prices and supply of these products.
7 This primarily relates to excise duties on petroleum products (53% of total revenues from excise du  ties 
in 2011), tobacco products (31%), alcohol and beer (7,4% of total revenues from excise duties in 2011)   
(Ministry of Finance Time Series Data, 2012).49
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The level of harmonization of Croatian customs system with the acquis is very 
high, and only some minor changes in customs legislations are expected. The 
Croatian Customs tariff for 2011 has been aligned with the 2011 EU Combined 
Nomenclature. Some minor discrepancies still remain in the quota allocation sy-
stem, inward/outward processing authorization, end-use and the internal transit 
arrangements (European Commission, 2011c). However, upon accession to the 
EU Croatia will lose a significant part of customs revenues which it realizes with 
the EU Member States, due to free entrance to the common internal EU market, 
i.e. accession to the Customs Union. Customs Union means free movements of 
goods and services by the abolition of physical and technical borders between 
Croatia and the EU Member States. In other words, upon accession to the EU only 
commodities imported from countries outside the EU will be subject to custom 
duties. According to the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (CBS, 2012), in 2010 Croa-
tia imported goods and services worth HRK 110 bn; HRK 66 bn (60%) of imports 
were from the EU Member States. In 2011 the level of imports increased to HRK 
121 bn, HRK 75 bn (62%) of them coming from the EU Member States (CBS, 
2012). With the assumption that a similar ratio of imports from the EU Member 
States will be retained in 2013 (60%), in the second part of the year 2013 only 
40% of imports will be subject to custom duties, and of these 75% of the revenue 
will be transferred to the EU budget as Traditional Own Resources of the EU 
budget. Resulting from increased imports in 2011, the share of customs revenue 
also increased from 0.49% of GDP in 2010 to 0.52% of GDP in 2011 (Ministry of 
Finance Time Series Data). With the assumption that the ratio of customs revenue 
to GDP will be maintained at 0.5% in 2013, it can be expected that there will be a 
reduction of customs revenue in a total amount of approximately 0.225% of GDP, 
which is calculated by the following expression:
____
2
0.5%
 ∙ 60% + ____
2
0.5%
 ∙ (1 – 60%) ∙ 75% = 0.225% GDP
Since the above stated conditions will be in place only in the second part of the 
year 2013 when Croatia becomes a formal EU Member State, both of these adde-
nds from expression (1) have to be divided by 2 in order to recalibrate the calcu-
lation to a semi-annual level. The first addend in the expression above amounts to 
0.15% of GDP and shows the loss of budget revenue in the second part of the year 
2013 as a result of the abolition of customs in the internal EU market, by which 
60% of semi-annual customs revenue will be automatically lost upon Croatian 
accession to the EU due to trade in goods with the EU Member States. The second 
addend in the total amount of 0.075% of GDP shows Traditional Own Resources 
of the EU budget, i.e. the remaining part of 40% of semi-annual customs revenue 
will be distributed to the EU and Croatian budget in the proportion of 3:1. Accor-
ding to predefined keys, 75% (0.075% of GDP) of semi-annual imports subject to 
customs will be transferred to the EU budget, while the remaining part of 25% 
(0.025% of GDP) will be kept in the Croatian budget.
(1)50
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It is very important to emphasize that upon the accession of Croatia to the EU all 
free trade agreements with third countries that Croatia signed independently will 
cease to apply, including the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). 
This will almost certainly have a specific repercussion on conditions of trade in 
goods, primarily in the regional context, with unfavorable effects on the Croatian 
trade balance. At the same time, upon accession to the EU, Croatia will be obliged 
to apply all agreements that current EU Member States have signed with third 
countries or with international organizations.
Upon accession of Croatia to the EU, in 2013 some funds will be transferred on 
the basis of VAT from the Croatian budget to the EU budget according to the ap-
plied rate of 0.3% on the VAT base or 50% of Croatian GNI. According to the data 
of European Commission (2007a), the Croatian VAT base is estimated at 57% of 
GNI, meaning that for the purpose of the calculation of VAT-based revenue a rate 
of 0.3% will be applied to the amount equal to 50% of GNI. According to Eurostat 
projections, the share of GDP in GNI in 2013 should amount to approximately 
1.05 (calculated based on Eurostat database). Therefore, Croatian contribution to 
the EU budget on the basis of VAT would amount to somewhere in the region of 
0.08% of GDP in 2013, which is derived from the following calculation:
0.3 ∙ 50% ∙ 1.05 = 0.08% GDP ____________
2
The first two members of the product in the numerator represent the application of 
the rate of 0.3% on 50% of GNI and the third member of the product in the nume-
rator represents the ratio of GDP to GNI. The whole represents the calculated an-
nual amount of VAT-based revenue from the Croatian budget as a share of GDP. 
Since Croatia will be EU Member State only in the second part of 2013, the above 
amount from the numerator has to be divided by 2 in order to get a semi-annual 
figure.
Total annual revenue of the EU budget on the basis of GNI amounted to about 
0.75% of GNI of all EU Member States in 2010 (European Commission, 2011a). 
For the purpose of the estimation of expenditure from the Croatian budget on this 
basis in 2013, an unchanged annual share of 0.75% of GNI at the level of the 
whole EU budget will be assumed. The total amount of Croatian expenditures 
based on GNI in 2013 is derived from the following expression and it amounts to 
0.36% of GDP.
0.75% ∙ (GNIEU − 27 + __
2
1 GNIHR) ∙
= 0.36% GDP
GNIEU -27 +  __
2
1 GNIHR
__
2
1 GNIHR
GDPHR
All GDP and GNI projected data for the year 2013 used in the calculation above 
are taken from the Eurostat database. Total GNI-based revenue of the EU budget 
(2)
(3)51
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in 2013 will comprise 0.75% of GNI of all 27 current EU Member States and half 
of the Croatian GNI projected for the year 2013 (since Croatia will be EU Member 
State only in the second part of 2013). The absolute amount of total expenditure 
from the Croatian budget on the basis of the GNI in 2013 is calculated by multi-
plication of total VAT-based revenue of the EU budget (first two members of the 
product in the numerator) and the share of Croatian semi-annual GNI in the total 
GNI base, where total GNI base represents EU-27 total annual GNI enlarged by 
the Croatian semi-annual GNI. For the final figure, i.e. relative amount of total 
expenditure from the Croatian budget on the basis of the GNI in 2013, it is neces-
sary to divide the absolute amount by the projection of the Croatian GDP for the 
year 2013.
Average annual expenditure of the New Member States for the UK correction in 
the period from 2005 to 2010 amounted to 0.068% of the GDP (European Com-
mission, 2011b). The same annual share in GDP will be assumed also in the 
projection for 2013, which means that Croatian contribution for the UK correction 
on a semi-annual basis would amount to 0.034% of GDP.
table 2 
Financial package from the EU for Croatia in 2013 (in million euro and   
% of GDP)
 
commitment 
appropriations 
Payment 
appropriations
 
Million 
euro
% GDP
Million 
euro
% GDP
1 Sustainable Growth (1a + 1b) 496.8 1.04 167.4 0.35
     1a Competitiveness for  
          Growth and Employment
47.4 0.10 17.6 0.04
     1b Cohesion for Growth  
          and Employment
449.4 0.94 149.8 0.31
          of which Structural Funds 299.6 0.63 89.9 0.19
          of which Cohesion Fund 149.8 0.31 59.9 0.13
2 Preservation and Management  
   of Natural Resources
20.4 0.04 12.1 0.03
          of which market related  
          expenditure and direct payments
9.0 0.02 9.0 0.02
3 Citizenship, freedom, security and justice  73.3 0.15 42.2 0.09
4 EU as a global player 0.0 0.00 77.6 0.16
5 Administration 22.0 0.05 22.0 0.05
6 Compensations (Cash-flow facility) 75.0 0.16 75.0 0.16
Total 687.5 1.44 396.3 0.83
Source: European Commission (2012); author’s adjustment.
Upon entering the EU, Croatia will have to provide a certain amount for equity 
and  reserves  contribution  for  the  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB).  Cuculić, 52
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  Faulend and Šošić (2004) estimated that amount to 0.03% of GDP, which is also 
in accordance with the payment of almost all New Member States in the first year 
of their membership (Money-Go-Round.eu database)8.
However, apart from the already mentioned categories of expenditures that will be 
transferred to the EU budget, the Croatian budget will also benefit from EU mem-
bership, manifested in the form of a various transfers from the EU budget. In May 
2012 the European Commission published a document as a preparation for the 
2013 Draft Budget (European Commission, 2012) including also the whole pro-
posal of a Croatia financial package for the semi-annual period of the EU mem-
bership. The main proposed budgeted categories of expenditures from the EU 
budget allocated to the Croatian budget, i.e. potential revenues of Croatian budget, 
are shown in table 2.
According to the data from table 2, in 2013 Croatia should receive overall finan-
cial funds in total amount of EUR 396 m from the EU, i.e. equivalently 0.83% of 
GDP. The major share of these funds in amount of EUR 167 m (0.35% of GDP) 
relates to category Sustainable Growth, including the subcategories Competitive-
ness for Growth and Employment and Cohesion for Growth and Employment. 
Funds dependant on projects amount to total EUR 159 m (0.33% of GDP) and 
include funds from Structural Funds in amount of EUR 90 m (0.19% of GDP), 
funds from the Cohesion Fund in amount of EUR 60 m (0.13% of GDP) and mar-
ket related expenditures amounting to around EUR 9 m (0.02% of GDP). Unlike 
payment appropriations including expected financial funds that should be paid to 
Croatia in 2013, commitment appropriations comprise total amount of all activi-
ties that should be executed, i.e. invoiced during 2013. Total amount of commit-
ment appropriations should amount to EUR 687.5 m or 1.44% of GDP, which is 
about 73% more than expected payment appropriations. The category EU as a 
global player does not include commitment appropriations, while payment appro-
priations are included in the draft budget and amount to EUR 77.6 m. The reason 
beyond is that upon accession of Croatia to the EU, funds aimed at external poli-
cies  will  no  longer  be  allocated to  Croatia, instead financing  of  Croatia will 
  be  come a part of the EU internal policies. Hence in 2013 there will be no new 
contracted payments from pre-accession funds, but there should be payments for 
projects contracted in some earlier period, which is visible in the payment appro-
priations item.
Table 2 does not include direct payments for which the sum of EUR 93.2 m is 
provided in 2013, according to the data of the Ministry of Finance (2012). These 
funds will be paid in 2014 for liabilities towards farmers per hectare of eligible 
area relevant in 2013. According to the data of the Ministry of Finance (2012) the 
total financial envelope for the first half year of the EU membership should amount 
8 Among all observed countries (NMS-8), only Poland paid in 0.04% of GDP for EIB in 2004, while all other 
countries paid in 0.03% of their GDP.53
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to around EUR 800 m. Apart from the already mentioned commitment appropria-
tions items that were presented in table 2 and that are dependent on different 
project activities, the envelope is also composed of the following funds: 
  – Schengen – external borders strengthening (EUR 40 m);
  – Reinforcement of institutions (EUR 29 m); 
  – Demining (EUR 2.4 m);
  – Supports to the budget in strengthening the financial position (EUR 75 m); 
  – Costs of administration in Brussels (EUR 22 m);
  – Participation in different EU programs – Seventh Framework Programme 
for Research, longlife learning, Erasmus Mundus, Trans-European Network 
for energy and transport (TEN-E and TEN-T; all together EUR 47.4 m).
In order to receive the allocated funds from the Structural Funds, Cohesion Fund 
and Rural Development Funds, the Croatian primary task is to establish adequate 
administrative absorption capacities and to prepare adequate project activities. 
Moreover, it is necessary to ensure funds for co-financing of projects at the state 
and local level, which will definitely represent an additional burden on the Croa-
tian budget. The minimum prescribed co-financing rate of a Member State corre-
sponds to 25% of total funds from the Structural Funds and Rural Development 
Funds and 15% of total funds from the Cohesion Fund. On the other hand, the EU 
has historically co-financed projects to the extent of between 50 and 85% (The 
European Bank Coordination (“Vienna”) Initiative, 2011), while the financing of 
the remaining part up to the total project value was the responsibility of the Mem-
ber State in question.
From the amounts planned for financing from the EU budget, as shown in table 2, 
it is quite easy to derive the amount of funds that should be secured by a Member 
State itself (in this case Croatia) for projects co-financing. This amount depends 
on the applied rate of Member State co-financing and can be expressed with the 
following formula:
Ri
MS = Ri
EU ∙ 1 - ri
 ri
where Ri
EU represents the amount of funds for projects financing from the EU 
budget and ri is the average applied co-financing rate of the Member State itself. 
Index i denotes a general category for co-financing, i.e. Structural Funds, Cohe-
sion Fund or Rural Development Funds.
From the calculation derived from the application of the equation (4) it can be 
concluded that Croatia will have to provide financial resources of approximately 
0.09% of GDP for co-financing projects under the assumption of the application 
of the minimum co-financing rate (25% of total funds from the Structural Funds 
and Rural Development Funds and 15% of total funds from the Cohesion Fund), 
i.e. 0.15% of GDP in the case of the application of the co-financing rate amounting 
(4)54
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to 10 percentage points higher than the minimum prescribed (35% of total funds 
from the Structural Funds and Rural Development Funds and 25% of total funds 
from the Cohesion Fund).
table 3 
Net position of Croatia in the EU budget and financial costs/benefits of accession 
in 2013 (% of GDP and in million euro)
Revenue/expenditure category % GDP Million euro
1 Payments from the EU budget 0.83 396.30
      Structural Funds 0.19 89.90
      Cohesion Fund 0.13 59.90
      Market related expenditure and direct  
      payments of the EU budget
0.02 9.00
      Other resources of the EU budget 0.50 237.50
2 Payments into the EU budget 0.55 260.33
      Traditional own resources 0.08 35.81
      VAT-based own resources 0.08 37.56
      GNI-based own resources 0.36 170.66
      UK correction 0.03 16.30
3 Other costs/benefits (˗/+) ˗0.13 ˗63.67
      EIB contribution (˗) 0.03 14.32
      Free trades with the EU (˗) 0.15 71.61
      Projects co-financing – average rates (˗) 0.15 73.22
      Projects co-financing – minimum rates 0.09 43.54
      Abolishment of VAT zero rates (+) 0.20 95.49
      Costs of institutions and reforms (˗) ? ?
Net position of Croatia in the EU budget (1-2) 0.28 135.97
Financial costs/benefits of accession (1-2-3) 0.15 72.29
Source: Author’s calculation.
From the calculation explained in the previous part of the text and presented in 
table 3 it is shown that Croatia should benefit in a financial way from the EU 
membership in 2013. The Croatian net position in the EU budget in 2013 shows 
that Croatia, just like all New Member States, should be a net recipient, in which 
the anticipated Croatian net position in the EU budget is equal to 0.28% of GDP, 
i.e. EUR 136 m in absolute terms9. Furthermore, the total net financial position of 
Croatia due to accession to the EU in 2013 should amount to approximately 0.15% 
of GDP, i.e. around EUR 72 m.
It is important to stress that figures from table 3 can be correctly interpreted exclu-
sively with assumption that all funds from the EU budget shown in table 2 flow 
directly into the general government budget, i.e. assuming all funds from the EU 
funds are used by the public sector. The implicitly contained assumption in the 
9 Nominal amount is calculated by multiplication of estimated effect (as a percent of GDP) with projection of 
GDP for 2013 (Eurostat database).55
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calculations is that all of these funds truly create the effect of substitution, i.e. they 
replace national financing in certain areas. Otherwise, the level of national fun-
ding would remain the same, while some funds from the EU budget would be an 
additional source of funds for projects and grants, but also an additional pressure 
on the budget.
Moreover, there is also a part of expenditure that is almost impossible to assess, 
since there are no publicly available data on the costs of building institutions and 
their maintenance, as well as costs of execution of reforms, so this is left out of the 
analysis. However, the cost of institutions involved in implementation of EU pro-
grams is already included in the Croatian budget, since the institutional framework 
for using the EU funds is mainly the continuation of a structure that is involved in 
the implementation of the pre-accession program (Ministry of Finance, 2010). 
Thus, these effects should not have any impact on this analysis.
5 croatian budget perspective in the period up to 2020
After accession to the EU, EU funds will be targeted to strengthening transport 
infrastructure (especially in the field of railway transport), water management, 
projects of centres for waste management, the energy sector, connecting science 
and the economy and business infrastructure. Special attention is also dedicated to 
the labour market, high-quality employment and social inclusion, promotion and 
execution of lifelong learning programmes and prequalifications in order to deve-
lop a flexible and competitive labour force (Ministry of Finance, 2012).
Real effects after 2013 are impossible to estimate adequately, since a large part of 
EU budget revenues and expenditures is still under special attention and it is cur-
rently considered an optimal model of financing and implementation. Still, for the 
purpose of the estimation of future expected net financial flows from the EU bud-
get, experiences of the EU New Member States can be definitely helpful. In this 
context, the New Member States (NMS) comprise 8 countries that have been EU 
Members since 1 May 2004, and these are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. These countries are especi-
ally interesting in this analysis since they entered the EU in the middle of the year, 
as Croatia should, and they are also connected to Croatia by a common geographi-
cal, political and social background.
Funds from the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund are available to regions, 
i.e. countries with GDP per capita lower than a specific percentage of the EU ave-
rage. In the case of the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund this percentage is 
75%, while a special arrangement of transition regions funds within Cohesion 
Policy is available to countries with a per capita GDP between 75% and 90% of 
the European average. According to Eurostat data, in 2010, Croatian GDP per 
capita equalled 61% of the EU average, which means that in the following period 
Croatia will be a candidate for receiving funds from the Structural Funds and the 56
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Cohesion Fund. Figure 5 shows per capita GDP movements of EU New Member 
States and Croatia in the period 1995-2010.
figure 5 
GDP per capita measured by purchasing power standard expressed as an average 
of EU-27 in the period 1995-2010
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Source: Author’s calculation.
In the whole period 1995-2010 all New Member States and Croatia were below 
the all 27 EU Member States average, but they recorded GDP per capita growth 
comparable to the EU-27 average10. Generally, it can be concluded that countries 
with higher initial GDP per capita have recorded slower growth and vice versa, a 
phenomenon known as real convergence11. A slower growth trend than Croatia in 
the observed period was recorded only by Slovenia, which had significantly hi-
gher GDP per capita in 1995 (74% of the EU-27 average), and by Poland and 
Hungary, which had relatively similar levels of GDP per capita in 1995 as Croatia 
(Hungary 51%, and Poland 43% of the EU-27 average)12. Therefore, it can be as-
sumed that the pre-accession phase, together with EU membership, has had a 
certain impact on the stimulation of the economic activity growth. With the opti-
mistic assumption of medium term growth as in the period from 2000 to 2010 
(growth from 50% to 61% of the EU-27 average, i.e. 22%), Croatia may reach in 
2020 the level of 74.4% of the EU-27 average GDP per capita in PPS, which me-
ans that it would come close to the transition countries threshold. Still, in view of 
current economic conditions, it is highly unlikely that in the following period up 
to 2020 Croatia could manage to record real economic activity growth as it did in 
10 EU-27 average is denoted with 100, and it is calculated retroactively for the whole period 1995-2004 such 
that includes average of all 27 current Member States, although some of them were not members of the EU 
in that time.
11 For more details on real convergence in the EU see for instance Vojinović and Oplotnik (2008), Halmai and 
Vásáry (2010), Kulhánek (2012) and European Commission (2009:33-34).
12 Growth trend in this case means a slope (regression coefficient) of a linear regression line of a specific 
country.57
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the pre-crisis period. Hence a more realistic scenario estimates much lower growth 
of GDP per capita to 63% of the EU-27 average in 202013. 
5.1 new member states’ experiences in the first years of the eu   
membership
The following text will show an analysis of the budget revenue of New Member 
States in the period 2004-2010, which will later on be used in an estimation of the 
Croatian potential. Figure 6 shows the budget revenue of New Member States on 
the basis of Structural Funds, as a percentage of GDP.
figure 6 
Revenue from Structural Funds to New Member States (% of GDP)
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Source: Author’s calculation.
The New Member States average shows a clear trend of revenue growth on the 
basis of the Structural Funds from the moment of accession to the EU in 2004 up 
to 2010. Expectedly, in the first years of EU membership, the share of the funds 
amounts to less than 0.5% of GDP due to implementation of starting project acti-
vities and development of absorption capacities. In the seventh year of EU mem-
bership, i.e. in 2010, the average share of revenue from the Structural Funds rea-
ched almost 1.5% of GDP. It is interesting to notice Lithuania in 2009 and Estonia 
in 2010 since these two NMS managed to withdraw funds in the total amount of 
around 3% of GDP. 
13 Calculated by using actual Croatian GDP growth estimates for the years 2012 and 2013 available from public 
press release of the Institute of Economics, Zagreb (2012) in which it is estimated that the Croatian real GDP 
growth rate was -1.3% in 2012 and will be 0.8% in 2013. For further projections, as well as for projections 
of average GDP growth rates of EU countries, IMF forecasts were used (IMF, 2012a; 2012b). For the sake of 
simplification of calculation of GDP per capita, it is assumed that the number of inhabitants in Croatia and 
the EU will not change significantly.58
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figure 7 
Revenue from Cohesion Fund to New Member States (% of GDP)
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Source: Author’s calculation.
As in the case of the Structural Funds, all New Member States satisfied the criteria 
for  getting  funds  from  the  Cohesion  Fund.  Since  the  Cohesion  Fund  is  also 
project-oriented, funds that a certain Member State manages to withdraw from the 
EU budget depend on projects and it is quite reasonable that the amount of funds 
withdrawn will gradually increase year by year as the absorption capacities are 
built. In the first two years of EU membership the amount of funds paid from the 
Cohesion Fund to NMS is almost negligible, while after these two years gradually 
increases year by year in the average amount of 0.1-0.2% of GDP. In the whole 
observed period from 2004 to 2010 Lithuania managed to withdraw the highest 
share of funds in GDP in 2009 and 2010 amounting to approximately 1.3% of 
GDP.
figure 8 
Revenue from Rural Development Funds to New Member States (% of GDP)
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Source: Author’s calculation.59
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Rural Development Funds paid to New Member States show a less obvious trend 
in the observed period 2004-2010. Nevertheless, as in the case of the Structural 
Funds and the Cohesion Fund, the lowest paid amount of funds was recorded in 
the first year of EU membership, i.e. in 2004, and afterwards increased. The hi-
ghest average paid amount was recorded in 2007 and amounts to 0.51% of GDP. 
In case of Rural Development Funds Lithuania also managed to withdraw the hi-
ghest share of funds with regard to the size of GDP in 2007 amounting to 1.07% 
of GDP.
figure 9 
Direct aids in agriculture to New Member States (% of GDP)
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Source: Author’s calculation.
Direct aids in agriculture were paid to New Member States for the first time in 
2005. Cuculić, Faulend and Šošić (2004) pointed out that payments of individual 
grants are delayed by about three months, which transfers payments into the next 
fiscal year, producing what is called the liquidity gap. In the period from 2005 to 
2008 the average share of direct aids in agriculture in GDP was kept at similar 
levels (averagely 0.37% of GDP), but it increased in 2009 to 0.52% of GDP and 
in 2010 to 0.58% of GDP. 
As mentioned above, the Cohesion Policy comprises the Structural Funds and the 
Cohesion Fund, while Natural Resources Policy comprises funds within the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy. Figure 10 shows the share of paid and allocated funds to 
New Member States in the period 2007-2010 divided into these two categories.
Figure 10 clearly shows a growth trend in utilized funds in the observed period in 
the Cohesion Policy category, which increased from an average of 47.2% in 2007 
to 73.6 in 2010. Among Member States there were significant differences by cate-
gories, which is indicated by the standard deviation, amounting to 31 percentage 
points in 2009. Shares of paid funds with regard to allocated funds to NMS are 60
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generally higher in the Natural Resources category. However, in this category 
there is no obvious trend of an increase in utilization as there is in the case of 
Cohesion for Growth and Employment. It is important to emphasize that between 
allocations and payments there is a certain time gap in cash flows. That is, the al-
located funds connote commitment appropriations and relate exclusively to funds 
available for contracting in the current year. On the other hand, paid funds con  note 
payment appropriations, i.e. relate to funds contracted in the current year, but also 
to those contracted in the past years, which are payable in the current year.
figure 10 
Share of paid and allocated funds to New Member States in 2007-2010 (%)
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Source: Author’s calculation based on European Commission (2007b; 2007c; 2011b).
Other revenues of Member States are somehow related also to the period before 
formal EU membership, since this category includes mainly pre-accession assi-
stance, but also special arrangements and budgetary compensations. These reve-
nues of New Member States show a clear growth trend up to 2004, which is the 
period including numerous preparations for institution development and admini-
stration, and for the purpose of building absorption capacities. In the period from 
2004 to 2007 the average share of other revenue from the EU budget to NMS re-
corded a sharp decrease, primarily due to a decline in residual cash flows for 
contracted projects covered by the pre-accession funds. In the period after 2007 
this share was kept at a stable level of about 0.15% of GDP.
Generally, it is very important to stress that not all countries have the same possi-
bilities of funds withdrawal, as measured by the share of their GDP. The reason is 
that some Member States have relatively higher, while on the other hand some of 
them have relatively lower allocations in the EU funds. According to data from 
European Commission (2007b; 2007c), calculated average of allocated funds for 
categories Cohesion for Growth and Employment and Rural Development for 61
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New Member States in the period 2007-2010 amounts to 3.2% of GDP, but the 
highest proportions of funds relative to the size of GDP were allocated to Hungary   
(4.0%), Lithuania (3.9%) and Latvia (3.7%). Lithuania generally has the highest 
proportions of received funds in the observed period 2004-2010, which can be 
mainly explained by higher allocated funds. IMF (2006) stresses that in the period 
from 2004 to 2006 approved funds from the EU funds to Lithuania amounted on 
average to 5.4% of GDP per annum, which is the highest share of funds in GDP 
among all New Member States. Latvia had a similar share in GDP, while all other 
Member States had over one percentage point lower approved amounts from the 
EU funds as a percentage of GDP. 
figure 11 
Other revenue from the EU budget to New Member States (% of GDP)
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5.2 croatian potential in the eu financial perspective from 2014 
to 2020
New Member States experiences examined in the previous part of the paper can 
serve as a good background for the estimation of the Croatian potential in the pe-
riod from 2014 to 2020 covered by the new EU financial perspective.
According to the Ministry of Finance (2012) data, from 2014 and onwards an 
annual amount of EUR 1.6 bn has been promised to Croatia from European funds 
used through the Cohesion Policy. The Rural Development Fund in 2013 will 
continue to be executed through IPARD and will amount to EUR 27.7 m, while in 
the following years it should be significantly higher and amount to around EUR 
330 m. In the financial envelope it is stated that funds in 2014 will be 2.33 times 
higher than those allocated for 2013, and in 2015 approximately 3 times higher 62
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than those in 201314. This means that in 2014 Croatia should have a disposable 
potential of around EUR 1.1 bn for using financing from the EU funds, in the ca-
tegories Cohesion Policy and Common Agricultural Policy. This amount should 
rise to EUR 1.4 bn in the period 2015-2020. However, here it is very important to 
stress two things. First, the new financial perspective is still not adopted, so these 
amounts promised to Croatia may be considered only as a possibility. Second, the 
total received funds from these sources will depend primarily on the capability of 
absorption of these funds, i.e. quality projects. 
figure 12 
Allocated and paid funds from EU funds (in billion euro) and share of paid and 
allocated funds (in %), period 2014-2020
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Based on average shares of paid and allocated funds in the case of the New Mem-
ber States (figure 10) gradual and stable growth of payments from the EU funds to 
Croatia in the whole period from 2014-2020 can be assumed. From table 2 it is 
noticeable that the expected proportion of paid and allocated funds for the items 
Cohesion Policy and Common Agricultural Policy should amount to 34.6% in 
2013. Assuming that Croatia will be recording linear growth from 34.6% in 2013 
to 76.5% in 2020 (where 76.5% represents a weighted average of Cohesion Policy 
and Common Agricultural Policy of New Member States in 2010 from figure 10) 
and with the assumption of allocated funds of EUR 1.1 bn in 2014 and EUR 1.4 
bn per annum in the whole period 2015-2020, it can be concluded that Croatia 
14 Financial envelope means the amount of funds that a candidate country manages to ensure during the nego-
tiating process and which will be available to this country after obtaining full membership status in the Euro-
pean Union. In case of Croatia a gradual increase of funds has been negotiated (the so called phase-in pe  riod), 
by which in the first one year period (1 July 2013 – 30 June 2014) Croatia would be entitled to 60% of its nor-
mal allocations, in the next one year period (1 July 2014 – 30 June 2015) 80% and after 1 July 2015 100% of 
its normal allocations (Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 2011). Additionally, total allocated funds in 
2013 will be significantly lower due to semi-annual membership.63
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could withdraw funds from the EU budget related to the EU funds in the total 
amount of EUR 5.2 bn in the new financial perspective 2014-2020. Thereby this 
amount continuously increases amounting to EUR 0.4 bn in 2014, EUR 0.6 bn in 
2015 up to EUR 1.1 bn in 2020. Projections of allocated and paid funds from the 
EU funds, as well as the share of paid and allocated funds in the period 2014-2020 
are shown on figure 12.
According to the data from table 2, Croatia could count on other revenue from the 
EU budget in the amount of EUR 237.5 m in 2013, i.e. 0.49% of GDP. Following 
the same dynamics of other revenues from the EU budget as in the figure 11, it can 
be concluded that Croatia may receive funds amounting to 0.6% of GDP in 2014, 
0.4% of GDP in 2015 and 0.2% of GDP in the whole following period up to 2020. 
This would correspond to approximately EUR 1.15 bn for the whole period 2014-
2020. Projection of total funds received from the EU budget in the period 2014-
2020 is shown in table 4.
table 4 
Projections  of  funds  received  from  the  EU  budget  in  the  period  2014-2020   
(% of GDP and in billion euro)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
total 
2014-20
1 Allocated funds related 
to EU funds (EUR bn)
1.07 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 9.32
2 Share of paid and 
allocated funds from  
the EU funds (%)
37.53 42.26 47.59 53.59 60.34 67.94 76.50 55.69
3 Paid funds from  
the EU funds (1*2)
0.40 0.58 0.65 0.74 0.83 0.93 1.05 5.19
4 Other revenues from 
the EU budget (EUR bn)
0.30 0.21 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 1.15
Total (3+4) 0.70 0.79 0.77 0.86 0.96 1.07 1.20 6.34
Source: Author’s calculation.
Total estimated amount of all funds that Croatia may receive from the EU budget 
in the period from 2014 to 2020 amounts to EUR 6.34 bn, whereby the annual 
amounts gradually increase year after year, starting from EUR 0.7 bn in 2014 to 
EUR 1.2 bn in 2020. It is also interesting to notice a slight decrease in total recei-
ved funds from the EU budget in 2016, compared to 2015. The reason for this 
decrease lies in the fact that other revenue from the EU budget significantly decre-
ases in the first years of EU membership primarily due to decreased payments 
agreed in the pre-accession period, while on the other hand utilized, i.e. received 
funds from the EU budget grow by slower dynamics. These two effects taken to-
gether led to this decline in projection for 2016. A rough estimate of the funds that 
Croatia could receive from the EU budget in the new financial perspective up to 64
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2020 may serve as an insight into possible perspective with numerous constraints 
mentioned in the previous text. Final realization will primarily depend on real al-
located funds, built administrative and financial capacities, as well as quality 
projects activities.
Figure 13 shows net positions of all Member States in the EU budget with regard 
to their GDP per capita in 2010.
figure 13 
Scatter  plot  of  operational  balance  of  the  EU  budget  and  GDP  per  capita   
(in current prices) in all Member States, year 2010
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Source: Author’s calculation.
Operational balance shows the net position of a certain Member State in the EU 
budget, i.e. the difference between payments into the EU budget and received 
funds from the EU budget. The scatter plot of the operational balance of the EU 
budget and GDP per capita (in current prices) of all Member States shows that 
there is a clear negative relationship between these two variables, meaning that 
Member States with higher GDP per capita generally record lower net financial 
positions with the EU budget and vice versa. For modelling this relationship an 
exponential function was shown as the best choice, since it fits realisations quite 
well, which is proven by the relatively high coefficient of determination (R2 stati-
stics) of 60%. Detailed statistics of the observed model, i.e. its transformation into 
the linear regression model, are displayed in table 515. It is interesting to notice 
that all New Member States are net recipients of funds from the EU budget, this 
15 A simple transformation of an exponential model into a linear regression model was made. By taking a natu-
ral logarithm of an expression y=αeβx a linear equation model expressed as y’=α’+βx is derived, where y’=logy 
and α’=logα. This means that there is a linear relationship between natural logarithm of GDP per capita mea-
sured by purchasing power standard and operational balance of the EU budget.65
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amount varying from the lowest 1.2% of GDP in case of Slovenia to the highest 
4.9% of GDP in case of Lithuania. 
table 5 
Estimated parameters and representativeness indicators of linear regression   
model of GDP per capita (natural logarithm) and operational balance of the EU 
budget
Variable estimate (t-statistics)a
Intercept (α)
10.21323
(100.45)***
Regression coefficient (β)
-0.3302
(-6.12)***
Representativeness indicators Realization of sample
Explained sum of squares (SSreg) 7.16726
Residual sum of squares (SSerr) 4.78345
Total sum of squares (SStot) 11.95071
F-statistics 37.46
p-value of F-statistics <0.0001
Coefficient of variation 4.43442
Coefficient of determination (R2) 0.5997
Adjusted coefficient of determination (Adj. R2) 0.5837
a Significance levels: 1% ***, 5% ** and 10% *.
Source: Author’s calculation.
Assuming that the modelled relationship between GDP per capita and operational 
balance of the EU budget is generally in place, from familiar GDP per capita fi-
gure the approximate net position of Croatia in the EU budget in a certain year can 
be estimated. A projection of Croatian GDP per capita in current prices in 2020 
amounts to EUR 15.445 and involves net receipts of funds from the EU budget in 
a total amount of 1.72% of GDP, i.e. EUR 1.13 bn16. Still, it has to be emphasized 
that this estimation was made assuming the current system of financing the EU 
budget, which means that all the potential changes explained in chapter three of 
this paper could significantly modify the final result. Hence this estimate of the 
Croatian net position could be primarily understood as a Croatian potential in 
2020, rather than a direct projection, since the final net position of Croatia in the 
EU budget will depend on a numerous set of variables impossible to assess fully 
qualitatively and quantitatively. Therefore all quantitative results given in the pa-
per should be interpreted with special care.
16 GDP forecast for 2020 was calculated from actual GDP growth and inflation rate estimations for 2012 and 
2013 available in the press release of the Institute of Economics, Zagreb (2012), which provides an esti  mate 
of Croatian real GDP growth rate of -1.3% in 2012 and 0.8% in 2013, as well as an inflation rate of 3.2% in 
2012 and 2.6% in 2013. Furthermore, it is assumed that there will be a linear real GDP growth up to 2.5% in 
2017 in accordance with IMF (2012a; 2012b) long term forecasts and stabilization of real GDP growth on the 
level of 2.5% up to 2020. In the whole period 2014-2020 a stable inflation rate of 2.5% is assumed. More-
over, for the sake of simplification it is implicitly assumed that population sizes in Croatia and the EU in 2020 
will remain the same as in 2013.66
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6 conclusion
Accession of Croatia to the EU will bring numerous changes certain to impact net 
cash flows from the EU budget to Croatian budget and vice versa. In the second 
half of the year 2013 Croatia will be included in the still current financial perspe-
ctive of the EU covering the period 2007-2013. According to estimation results 
presented in this paper Croatia should a record positive net financial position in 
the EU budget in a total amount of EUR 136 m, i.e. 0.28% of GDP. This means 
that Croatia, just like all other New Member States, should also be a net recipient 
of funds from the EU budget. Total net financial position of Croatia due to the EU 
membership includes also additional costs and benefits of accession like various 
harmonisations and need for project co-financing at the state and local levels. 
Even in this variant, Croatia should be in plus to a total amount of EUR 72 m, i.e. 
0.15% of GDP. 
The period from 2014-2020 is covered by the new financial perspective of the EU 
described in the multiannual financial framework. In the proposal of this future 
financial perspective, that was actual in the time of writing this paper, numerous 
changes in the EU budget financing system are envisaged; the most important are 
the abolition of current VAT-based own resources and the introduction of new re-
venue based on VAT, the introduction of a financial transactions tax, an expected 
decline in the share of GNI-based own resources of the EU budget and simplifica-
tion of various correction mechanisms. However, it has to be stressed that for the 
moment this represents only a proposal and it is highly likely that some of propo-
sed changes will not be adopted in the end. Nevertheless, there is definitely a need 
to undertake further analyses in order to assess the future implications of these 
taxes for all participants in the process, i.e. final consumers, the financial sector 
and government authorities in Croatia.
Apart from changes in the financing of the EU budget, also planned are some 
changes in financing from the EU budget. Newly proposed changes of financing 
from the EU funds should bring about a more equal and fair distribution of funds 
among Member States aimed at maintenance of the Cohesion Policy and Common 
Agricultural Policy in line with the long term objectives of the EU development. 
According to the assessment presented in the paper, in the new financial perspe-
ctive from 2014-2020, Croatia could withdraw funds from the EU funds in total 
amount of EUR 5.2 bn, but it is very important to emphasize that this amount on 
an annual level increases from EUR 0.4 bn in 2014 to EUR 1.1 bn in 2020. The 
total amount of funds that Croatia may receive in the period 2014-2020 includes 
some  residual  pre-accession  assistances,  special  arrangements  and  budgetary 
compensations. This amount is estimated at EUR 6.34 bn, whereby on an annual 
level it gradually increases from EUR 0.7 bn in 2014 up to EUR 1.2 bn in 2020. 
By the exponential regression analysis from historical data of all EU Member 
States it is estimated that the expected Croatian GDP per capita in 2020 would 67
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imply the net receipt of funds from the EU budget in the total amount of EUR 1.13 
bn, i.e. 1.72% of GDP.
It is important to stress that all figures assessed and elaborated in the paper repre-
sent only expectations, taking into account huge number of assumptions and that 
the final realization of Croatian financial flows from the moment of its accession 
to the EU in the mid 2013 up to 2020 is attended by numerous uncertainties. It is 
definitely needed to develop quality strategies for improvements in absorption 
capacities for the future period governed by the experiences and best practices of 
New Member States. Comprehensive monitoring of utilizations of withdrawn 
funds compared to allocated funds should be initiated, as well as projections of 
possible scenarios for a future period. These types of analyses should indicate all 
potential imperfections in existing processes and provide clear guidelines for fu-
ture developments and improvements. Furthermore, broader potential costs and 
benefits (not necessarily of financial matters) of EU membership have not been 
elaborated in this paper, for instance, opening the European market to Croatia, 
development of competitiveness, political, social, regulatory and other changes.68
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